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What’s My Age Again? The Immigrant Age 
Problem in the Criminal Justice System 
Ross Pearson* 
According to government documents, on New Year’s Day, 
1997, Gadeise Gebywe celebrated her birthday with a special 
gift: she gave birth to her daughter, Derartu.1 And while two 
New Year’s birthdays would be rare enough, the coincidence 
did not end with mother and daughter. Gadeise’s friend, Amina 
Adam, was also born on January 1,2 as were an estimated 
200,000 other immigrants living in the United States.3 In reali-
ty, odds are Derartu was not born on New Year’s Day, and 
maybe not even in 1997. But because Derartu—like Gadeise, 
Amina, and roughly 200,000 other refugees—does not have rec-
ords of her birth, the government uses the date Derartu’s 
mother estimated, January 1, 1997, for administrative purpos-
es.4
These approximated birth dates allow the government to 
administer benefits
 
5 and track and control immigration flow,6
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gence; and Laura Stecker for her continuous love and support. Copyright 
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 1. Annie Baxter, Jan. 1 a Common Birth Date for Many Immigrants, 
MINN. PUB. RADIO (Dec. 29, 2009), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/ 
web/2009/12/29/january-1-birthdays/. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Michelle Breidenbach, On New Year's Day, Wish a 'Happy Birthday' 
to 202,000 Refugees, THE POST-STANDARD, Jan. 1, 2011, http://www.syracuse 
.com/news/index.ssf/2011/01/on_new_years_day_wish_a_happy.html. 
 4. Baxter, supra note 1; Breidenbach, supra note 3. 
 5. Cf. INNOCENTI RESEARCH CTR., UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN’S FUND, 
BIRTH REGISTRATION AND ARMED CONFLICT 2 (2007), available at http://www 
.unicef.org/protection/birth_registration_and_armed_conflict(1).pdf [hereinaf-
ter UNICEF, BIRTH REGISTRATION] (discussing hampered access to social ser-
vices for displaced children around the globe). 
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but they lack both certainty and accuracy. This uncertainty and 
inaccuracy breeds the immigrant age problem, a problem that 
arises when these immigrants clash with a criminal justice sys-
tem that demands greater age-specificity than these immi-
grants can provide. Specifically, the immigrant age problem 
arises at three stages of the criminal process. First, a defend-
ant’s age may determine which court—juvenile or adult—has 
jurisdiction,7 so the prosecutor must know the defendant’s age 
to charge him in the right court. Second, a defendant’s or vic-
tim’s age might be an element of the crime,8 requiring the State 
to prove age beyond a reasonable doubt. Third, a defendant’s 
age may limit the maximum sentence a court may render.9
Age matters, but courts have not crafted standards to solve 
the immigrant age problem. Different states place different 
burdens on prosecutors to prove a defendant’s age as a jurisdic-
tional fact,
 
10 and many states have not addressed this prob-
lem.11 Uncertainty surrounding the defendant’s or victim’s age 
may allow the defendant to escape prosecution.12 And while the 
Supreme Court has held that children under age eighteen can-
not get death sentences, courts have not addressed how to de-
termine a proper sentence when they do not know the defend-
ant’s age.13
 
 6. See DANIEL C. MARTIN & JAMES E. YANKAY, U. S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SEC., ANNUAL FLOW REPORT: REFUGEES AND ASYLEES: 2011, at 3 (2012). 
 
 7. See MELISSA SICKMUND, JUVENILES IN COURT, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 
5 (2003), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/195420/contents 
.pdf. 
 8. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.342 (2011) (criminalizing sexual conduct in 
the first degree based on the age difference between the victim and defendant). 
 9. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012) (holding unconsti-
tutional mandatory sentences of life without parole for juveniles); Graham v. 
Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010) (holding that the Eighth Amendment 
categorically prohibits life without parole sentences for juveniles convicted of 
non-homicide offenses); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005) (hold-
ing death sentences for juveniles categorically unconstitutional). 
 10. Compare State v. Ali, 806 N.W.2d 45, 46 (Minn. 2011) (preponderance 
of the evidence), with State v. Mohamed, 899 N.E.2d 1071, 1075 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2008) (beyond a reasonable doubt).  
 11. See, e.g., E-mail from Kim Hegvik, Assistant State’s Attorney, Cass 
Cnty., N.D., to author (Nov. 14, 2012, 14:54 CST) (on file with author) [herein-
after Hegvik e-mail]. 
 12. Cf. Laura Yuen, 3 Guilty in Somali Gang Sex Trafficking Case, MINN. 
PUB. RADIO (May 4, 2012), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2012/ 
05/04/sex-trafficking (noting that defendants challenged victim’s age due to 
victim’s invalid birth certificate).  
 13. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 578–79. 
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This Note develops standards to address the refugee age 
problem in the criminal process. Part I examines the origins of 
the age problem and discusses the significance of age in each 
step of the criminal process: charging, trial, and sentencing. 
Next, Part II analyzes the problems age uncertainty creates 
and how courts address these issues at each step of the crimi-
nal process. Finally, Part III addresses possible solutions and 
proposes burdens of proof for each stage of the process. Specifi-
cally, this Note argues that (1) at charging, the refugee’s age 
documentation should serve as rebuttable proof of age; (2) at 
trial, the refugee’s age documentation should not be admissible 
for proof of age; and (3) at sentencing, the court should not con-
sider the refugee’s age at all, but rather his “age characteris-
tics.” 
I.  BACKGROUND   
In most cases, the court will know the defendant’s age. In 
others, it will not. But current immigration procedures allow 
immigrants without known birth dates to obtain official gov-
ernment documents that list their “official” birth dates.14
This section first traces how the immigrant age problem 
originates. Specifically, it examines how an immigrant can en-
ter immigration proceedings without knowing his date of birth 
and exit with an official document—and therein government 
certification—that lists a precise birth date. Next, this section 
explores the three stages at which a defendant’s age can sub-
stantially affect the criminal process: charging, trial, and sen-
tencing. 
 There-
fore, the immigrant age problem presents a unique dilemma: 
the defendant has an “official” date of birth, but the court still 
does not know his age. 
A. UNREGISTERED CHILDREN 
The immigrant age problem stems from inaccurate birth 
documents, so it often begins abroad when children are born 
but not given official birth records.15 While the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of a Child dictates that States should 
register children immediately after birth,16
 
 14. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b) (2012). 
 births often go un-
 15. UNICEF, BIRTH REGISTRATION, supra note 5, at 3. The process of re-
cording children’s birth dates is called “registration.” Id. 
 16. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. VII, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 
U.N.T.S. 3; see also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 
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registered,17 usually for one of four reasons.18 First, legal re-
quirements may impose barriers on families that prevent them 
from registering births. For instance, some states charge high 
registration fees,19 only register children born in wedlock,20 or 
require parents to identify themselves before they can register 
their children.21 Second, countries in armed conflict, such as 
Ethiopia and Sudan, lack the administrative systems needed to 
record and track childbirths.22 Third, some parents refuse to 
register their children out of fear that the government will use 
registration logs to target their children for ethnic cleansing or 
conscription.23 Finally, some cultures simply do not emphasize 
birth registration.24
Without proper birth registration, children face a number 
of problems. They might not receive social benefits.
 
25 They 
might be unable to reconnect with separated family members.26 
And they might be forcibly trafficked without detection.27
 
24, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (“Every child shall be registered immedi-
ately after birth and shall have a name.”). 
 
 17. Facts and Figures, PLAN, http://plan-international.org/ 
birthregistration/the-campaign/facts-and-figures/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2013). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Cf. Mariana Muzzi, UNICEF Good Practices in Integrating Birth Reg-
istration into Health Systems (2000–2009); Case Studies: Bangladesh, Brazil, 
the Gambia and Delhi, India 6 (United Nations Children’s Fund, Working Pa-
per, Jan. 2010), available at http://www.unicef.org/protection/Birth_ 
Registration_Working_Paper(2).pdf (suggesting making birth registration free 
of charge as a way to increase registration). 
 20. Id. at 42. 
 21. For example, in certain areas of Peru, parents must present their own 
identification to register a child to discourage the parents from associating 
with rebel groups. UNICEF, BIRTH REGISTRATION, supra note 5, at 8. There-
fore, parents that do not have documents themselves cannot register their 
children either. Id. 
 22. Id. at 7. 
 23. Id. at 10. 
 24. See, e.g., United States v. Dire, 680 F.3d 446, 476 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(“[M]ost Somalis do not know their exact birth date . . . .” (quoting United 
States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 642, 676–77 (E.D. Va. 2010))). 
 25. UNICEF, BIRTH REGISTRATION, supra note 5, at 11. 
 26. Id. at 13–14. 
 27. Id. at 9. For example, in Southeast Europe, non-governmental organi-
zations estimate that 70 percent of trafficked women and girls do not have val-
id birth documents. UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN’S FUND ET AL., TRAFFICKING 
IN HUMAN BEINGS IN SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE 141 (2002), available at http:// 
www.osce.org/odihr/18540. But cf. ASIAN DEV. BANK, LAW AND POLICY RE-
FORM AT THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK 2007: LEGAL IDENTITY FOR INCLU-
SIVE DEVELOPMENT 5 (Caroline Vandenabeele & Christine V. Lao eds., 2007) 
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Proper documentation alone can help alleviate some of the-
se problems—regardless of whether the document accurately 
lists the child’s birthday.28 Therefore, in order to prevent these 
problems, many international organizations partner with for-
eign governments to increase registration rates.29 The goal is 
simple: give each child a birth document. But to achieve this 
goal, the child’s actual birth date is immaterial. After all, any 
form of registration will allow a child to collect social benefits, 
reunite with separated family, and better avoid trafficking.30 
Therefore, these organizations allow parents to estimate the 
child’s date of birth, sometimes up to ten years after his actual 
birth.31 As a result, the child ends up with an official birth doc-
ument with an inaccurate birth date.32
B. IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES 
 
When children emigrate to – or take refuge in – the United 
States, immigration procedures require that the government 
give them official documents listing biographical information, 
including date of birth.33 In fact, even when the child does not 
know his exact date of birth, the government must still give 
him an official document that lists a date of birth, albeit an es-
timated date.34 As a result, by law the child will end up holding 
an official government identification with an official birth date, 
even though that date is based merely on the child’s (or his 
parents’) best guess.35 Specifically, this paradox occurs in two 
instances. First, the estimated date of birth listed on a child’s 
birth registration36 will become his “official” U.S. birth date. Se-
cond, when the child has no registration, he may estimate a 
birth date, which will then become his “official” birth date.37
 
(noting that in developing countries birth registration might not fix these 
problems). 
 
 28. See supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text. 
 29. See Muzzi, supra note 19, at 5. 
 30. Id. at 35. 
 31. See CLAIRE CODY, PLAN, COUNT EVERY CHILD: THE RIGHT TO BIRTH 
REGISTRATION 63 (2009) [hereinafter PLAN, COUNT EVERY CHILD], available at 
http://plan-international.org/birthregistration/files/count-every-child-2009. 
 32. See id. 
 33. See E-mail from Steve Blando, Pub. Affairs Officer, U.S. Citizenship & 
Immigration Servs., to author (Oct. 23, 2012, 08:32 CST) [hereinafter Blando 
e-mail] (on file with author). 
 34. See id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See supra Part I.A. 
 37. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b) (2012). 
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United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(USCIS) requires immigrants and asylees to present a birth 
certificate when they apply to immigrate to the U.S.38 But the 
USCIS Handbook neither defines “birth certificate” nor limits 
acceptable birth certificates to countries with high registration 
rates.39 Therefore, USCIS will accept birth certificates from 
nongovernmental organizations or countries with poor registra-
tion rates—both of which may contain estimated birth dates.40 
This process makes the first path from estimated to official 
birth date simple. The child is born. Years later, a nongovern-
mental organization registers his birth using a date his parents 
estimate.41 The child presents this certificate to USCIS.42 And 
this date becomes his “official birth date” for all other govern-
ment documents.43
Second, when applicants do not have any birth documents, 
USCIS allows them to estimate their birth dates.
 
44 Before esti-
mating their birth dates, these applicants must first prove that 
their birth documents are unavailable.45 But proving these doc-
uments are unavailable is not always difficult. For instance, 
the applicant may submit a letter from his home nation that 
his birth document does not exist,46 or he can show that he 
made good faith (but fruitless) attempts to get his birth docu-
ment.47
 
 38. See id. § 103.2(b)(1) (“Each benefit request must be properly completed 
and filed with all initial evidence required by applicable regulations and other 
USCIS instructions.”); see also U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., 
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OMB NO. 1615-0037, FORM I-730 REFUGEE/ASYLEE 
RELATIVE PETITION INSTRUCTIONS 3–4 (2013) [hereinafter FORM I-730] (re-
quiring a birth certificate for applications from relatives).  
 USCIS will then waive the birth document require-
 39. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.2 (not defining birth certificate). 
 40. Cf. id. (stating only that a birth certificate is a required document).  
 41. See supra Part I.A. 
 42. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(1). 
 43. See Blando e-mail, supra note 33. 
 44. See FORM I-730, supra note 38, at 4.  
 45. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(2)(ii). 
 46. Id. In fact, if the State Department’s Visa Reciprocity Tables state 
that the applicant’s home country normally does not keep birth documents, 
USCIS may accept other proof of birth without a letter from the home country. 
Blando e-mail, supra note 33. For example, a Somali refugee would not need to 
show his birth document is unavailable because the State Department’s Visa 
Reciprocity Table for Somalia notes, “There are no police records, birth certifi-
cates, school records etc., available from Somalia.” County Reciprocity Sched-
ule, Somalia, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://travel.state.gov/visa/fees/fees_5455 
.html?cid=9738 (last visited Oct. 31, 2013). 
 47. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(2)(ii). 
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ment.48 With this requirement waived, USCIS permits the ap-
plicant to submit “secondary evidence”49—such as school rec-
ords—and his own testimony,50
In both cases, the estimated birth date becomes part of the 
applicant’s immigration file,
 which USCIS will use to esti-
mate the applicant’s age.  
51 as well as his official birth date 
on government records.52
How prevalent is this problem? It is unclear—USCIS does 
not specifically track how often it assigns official-yet-inaccurate 
birth dates.
 In effect, USCIS certifies that the 
date of birth is accurate. 
53 But government immigration statistics suggest 
that the problem occurs with some level of frequency. For in-
stance, according to the State Department, in war-torn Iraq 
birth registration documents are frequently “withheld in indi-
vidual cases for political or other reasons.”54 Therefore, when 
Iraqi children take refuge in the United States, USCIS will as-
sign them birth dates.55 And these Iraqi children are not 
alone—USCIS will also assign birth dates to Bhutanese,56 
Somalian,57 and Iranian58
 
 48. See id. § 103.2(b)(2)(i).  
 children, none of whom come from 
countries that keep birth records. Over the three-year span 
from 2009 to 2011, over 105,000 people took refuge in the U.S. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. § 103.2(b)(7). 
 51. Blando e-mail, supra note 33.  
 52. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SEC., OMB NO. 1615-0023, INSTRUCTIONS FOR I-485, APPLICATION TO REGIS-
TER PERMANENT RESIDENCE OR ADJUST STATUS 3 (2013) (using this process 
for registering for permanent residence). In fact, this estimated birth date pro-
cedure does not just apply to immigrants. A U.S. citizen may obtain a passport 
upon a sworn affidavit of birth and evidence that no record of his birth exists. 
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, OMB APPROVAL NO. 1405-0132, BIRTH AFFIDAVIT (2011) 
(“A birth affidavit should be submitted (with an application for a U.S. pass-
port) when an acceptable birth certificate cannot be obtained for a person born 
in the United States. The affidavit must be accompanied by a notice from the 
appropriate authorities indicating that no birth record exists and a photocopy 
of the front and back side of the affiant’s identification.”). 
 53. Blando e-mail, supra note 33. 
 54. Country Reciprocity Schedule, Iraq, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://travel 
.state.gov/visa/fees/fees_5455.html?cid=9218 (last visited Oct. 31, 2013). 
 55. See supra notes 44–50 and accompanying text. 
 56. See Country Reciprocity Schedule, Bhutan, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
http://travel.state.gov/visa/fees/fees_5455.html?cid=9005 (last visited Oct. 31, 
2013). 
 57. See Country Reciprocity Schedule, Somalia, supra note 46.  
 58. See Country Reciprocity Schedule, Iran, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http:// 
travel.state.gov/visa/fees/fees_5455.html?cid=9217 (last visited Oct. 31, 2013). 
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from one of these four countries,59 a stream of people with esti-
mated birth dates certified as official. Therefore, while the fre-
quency of the immigrant age problem is unknown,60
C. AGE AND THE CRIMINAL PROCESS 
 immigra-
tion statistics suggest that the age problem is potentially vast.  
In many contexts, a child’s exact birth date is both imma-
terial and malleable—as any summer-born third grader forced 
to celebrate with his classmates in January would know. But 
the criminal justice system specifically distinguishes based on 
age in three contexts: determining jurisdiction, proving age-
specific elements, and imposing maximum sentences.61
1. Juvenile Court Jurisdiction 
 The 
immigrant age problem, therefore, arises when children with 
uncertain-yet-official birth dates collide with the criminal jus-
tice system in one of these contexts.  
In the criminal justice process, the defendant’s age first 
matters when the state must decide whether to charge the de-
fendant in juvenile or adult court.62 At charging, age is relevant 
for two reasons. First, the defendant’s age determines which 
court has original jurisdiction.63 Most juvenile courts have ju-
risdiction over children up to age eighteen,64 while other states 
use lower limits, such as sixteen65 or seventeen.66 Second, some 
states set maximum age limits for juvenile courts to rehabili-
tate defendants, so once the defendant reaches the maximum 
age, he “ages out” and the juvenile court loses jurisdiction.67
 
 59. See MARTIN & YANKAY, supra note 
 
6, at 3.  
 60. See Blando e-mail, supra note 33. 
 61. See, e.g., H.D. Warren & C.P. Jhong, Annotation, Age of Child at Time 
of Alleged Offense or Delinquency, or at Time of Legal Proceedings, as Criterion 
of Jurisdiction of Juvenile Court, 89 A.L.R.2d 506 § 2 (1963). 
 62. Id. § 3(d). 
 63. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30822, JUVENILE DE-
LINQUENTS AND FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW: THE FEDERAL JUVENILE DELIN-
QUENCY ACT AND RELATED MATTERS 7–26 (2004). 
 64. Id.; see, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 260B.007 subd. 3 (2012). 
 65. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1501(7) (2012). 
 66. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.02(2)(A) (West 2009). 
 67. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-36(6) (2012) (“[W]hen the child at-
tains the age of twenty years, all orders affecting the child then in force termi-
nate and the child is discharged from further obligation or control.”). 
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Therefore, the defendant’s age affects whether the juvenile 
court has jurisdiction, and for how long.68
In fact, age is most relevant in the criminal process in ju-
venile court due to the lower penalties for juveniles than 
adults. For example, imagine that two Fargo teens rob a 7-
Eleven, and each fires a shot, a class A felony in North Dako-
ta.
 
69 The first robber is seventeen, so the juvenile court will 
have jurisdiction,70 and he will age out of juvenile court at age 
twenty.71 The second robber, however, is eighteen, so the dis-
trict court will have jurisdiction,72 and he will face a maximum 
penalty of twenty years in jail.73 Therefore, even though the two 
defendants committed the same crimes, they face substantially 
different punishments if convicted. The first robber will be free 
when he is twenty.74 The second robber may not be free until 
he’s nearly forty.75
Therefore, whether the juvenile or adult court has jurisdic-
tion significantly affects the sentence the defendant will re-
ceive. And because the defendant’s age determines which court 
has jurisdiction,
 
76 the defendant’s age significantly affects the 
sentence he could serve. So the immigrant with an assigned 
birth date has a substantial interest in his age when the state 
charges him with a crime.77
However, two exceptions to a juvenile court’s exclusive age 
jurisdiction over children make the age problem less relevant. 
First, some states give juvenile and district courts concurrent 
jurisdiction, so the State may choose to prosecute the child in 
 
 
 68. For instance, if a district court found that the defendant was a child, 
but his birth certificate showed he was an adult, the juvenile court would end 
up having jurisdiction due to the district court order. However, the juvenile 
court would again risk losing jurisdiction, because it could only rehabilitate 
the child up until a certain age. This critical age, in turn, would have to be de-
termined based on his or her faulty birth certificate. See, e.g., Hegvik e-mail, 
supra note 11. 
 69. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-22-01 (2012) (classifying robbery as an A 
felony when the perpetrator fires a firearm). In North Dakota, a Class A felony 
is a felony that carries a maximum penalty of twenty years imprisonment and 
a twenty thousand dollar fine. Id. § 12.1-32-01(2). 
 70. Id. § 27-20-03. 
 71. See id. § 27-20-36(6). 
 72. See id. §§ 27-20-02(4)(a), 27-20-03 (giving juvenile courts jurisdiction 
for a child under the age of eighteen). 
 73. See id. § 12.1-32-01(2). 
 74. See id. § 27-20-36(6). 
 75. See id. § 12.1-32-01(2). 
 76. See supra notes 63–68 and accompanying text. 
 77. See, e.g., Hegvik e-mail, supra note 11. 
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either juvenile or adult court.78 Therefore, even when it is un-
clear whether an immigrant is, say, seventeen or eighteen, the 
State may choose to prosecute him in a district court.79 Second, 
juvenile courts may waive or transfer jurisdiction to district 
courts based on the nature of the crime80 or the offender’s age 
combined with various aggravating factors.81 In these states, 
the uncertainty surrounding an immigrant’s age may not serve 
as a bar to prosecution in adult court because the juvenile court 
may waive jurisdiction and allow the state to prosecute in dis-
trict court regardless of the offender’s age.82
Nonetheless, in states where the juvenile court has exclu-
sive jurisdiction, or the juvenile court chooses not to waive ju-




2. Age as an Element of the Crime 
 
The age problem also arises when age is an element of the 
crime,84 so the state must prove the victim’s or defendant’s age 
beyond a reasonable doubt.85 Minnesota’s criminal code, for ex-
ample, criminalizes statutory rape based on the victim’s age: 
sex with a victim less than thirteen years old is criminal sexual 
conduct, even if the victim consents.86 But Minnesota classifies 
the degree of criminal sexual conduct based on the defendant’s 
age. If the defendant was three years older than the victim, he 
committed first degree sexual conduct,87 and he must serve at 
least twelve years in jail.88
 
 78. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-501(B) (LexisNexis 2012). 
 If the defendant was less than three 
years older than the victim, he only committed third degree 
 79. See id. 
 80. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-127(b) (2012) (permitting juve-
nile court to waive jurisdiction for C or D felonies). 
 81. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-203(a), (d) (2012) (permitting a court to 
waive jurisdiction for any child over fourteen years old based on six factors). 
 82. See id. Yet even in states where juvenile courts may waive jurisdic-
tion, the court must still know the defendant’s age to determine if he is old 
enough to transfer into an adult court. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 232.45(6) (2012) 
(permitting the juvenile court to waive jurisdiction for any crime if the defend-
ant is at least fourteen years old). 
 83. See supra notes 69–75 and accompanying text. 
 84. See, e.g., Yuen, supra note 12. 
 85. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
 86. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.342 subd. 1 (2012) (criminalizing sexual 
conduct based on the age difference between the defendant and victim).  
 87. Id.  
 88. Id. § 609.342 subd. 2(b). 
  
2013] WHAT’S MY AGE AGAIN 755 
 
sexual conduct,89 which carries no minimum sentence.90 There-
fore, to ensure a minimum jail sentence for the defendant, the 
state must prove two age-specific elements: (1) the victim was 
thirteen or younger; and (2) the defendant was at least three 
years older than the victim.91
However, if either the victim or the defendant has an offi-
cial-yet-inaccurate birth dates, the 12-year difference in mini-
mum jail time
  
92 may depend on the age USCIS assigned the 
victim or defendant based on an estimate.93
3. Age as a Sentencing Factor 
 
Finally, the immigrant age problem arises in sentencing 
when a court must determine whether it can sentence the de-
fendant to death or life without parole for a non-homicide of-
fense, both of which the Supreme Court has categorically pro-
hibited for defendants under eighteen.94 First, in Roper v. 
Simmons, the Court held that the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments prohibit states from executing children that 
committed capital crimes before they turned eighteen.95 In Rop-
er, the Court drew a bright line based on age: the state may not 
execute a seventeen year old, but it may execute an eighteen 
year old.96 More recently, in Graham v. Florida, the Court held 
that the Eighth Amendment prohibits states from sentencing 
juveniles to life without parole for non-homicide offenses.97
 
 89. Id. § 609.344 subd. 1(a). 
 As 
in Roper, the Graham Court structured its prohibition of life 
without parole sentences for non-homicide offenses solely based 
of the defendant’s age, so the state may sentence an eighteen 
 90. Id. § 609.344 subd. 2. 
 91. Id. § 609.342 subd. 1(a). 
 92. See supra notes 88, 90 and accompanying text. 
 93. See supra Part I.A. 
 94. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010) (prohibiting im-
position of life without parole for a non-homicide offense on a juvenile); Roper 
v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005) (forbidding death penalty under the 
age of 18). Courts may also consider a defendant’s age and age characteristics 
to mitigate the defendant’s sentence. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL § 5H1.1 (2012).  
 95. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578–79. 
 96. See id.  
 97. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034. 
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year old to life without parole for a non-homicide offense, but 
not a seventeen year old.98
Although the Supreme Court prohibited these sentences 
based on the defendant’s age, it reached its decisions on the 
grounds that children are less mature than adults psychologi-
cally, so they should not be punished equally.
 
99 For instance, in 
Roper, the Court reasoned that three relevant characteristics 
distinguish children and adults.100 First, children are psycholog-
ically less mature than adults, causing them to make poor and 
reckless decisions.101 Second, peer pressure affects juveniles 
more than adults, giving them less control in some situations.102 
Third, a juvenile’s character has yet to fully develop, so the 
criminal justice system can more easily rehabilitate the juve-
nile.103 In fact, the Court expounded on Roper in Miller v. Ala-
bama, when it invalidated mandatory life without parole sen-
tences for juveniles on the grounds that such rigid and severe 
sentences fail to properly account for the defendant’s “age-
related characteristics.”104
These age-related characteristics do not necessarily disap-
pear when children turn eighteen.
 
105 Nonetheless, the court has 
drawn a bright line and categorically prohibited death sentenc-
es and life without parole sentences for non-homicide offenses 
for children that committed the crime before their eighteenth 
birthday.106
This distinction complicates the immigrant age problem. 
An immigrant with an estimated birth date could fall on either 
side of the constitutionally critical age (eighteen), so the severi-
ty of his sentence could potentially depend on an unreliable es-




 98. See id. at 2030 (“[T]hose who were below [the age of eighteen] when 
the offense was committed may not be sentenced to life without parole for a 
non-homicide crime.”). 
 
 99. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 570. 
 100. Id. at 569–70. 
 101. Id. at 569; see also L.P. Spear, The Adolescent Brain and Age-Related 
Behavioral Manifestations, 24 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REVS. 417, 
421 (2000). 
 102. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569. 
 103. Id. at 570. 
 104. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460, 2475 (2012). 
 105. See Spear, supra note 101, at 419 (noting that characteristics of ado-
lescence may occur in people anywhere from ages twelve to twenty-five). 
 106. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578–89. 
 107. See Blando e-mail, supra note 33. 
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II.  ANALYSIS   
Because age is relevant at three phases of the criminal jus-
tice process, courts must know the defendant’s exact age. Yet 
the immigrant age problem hides the defendant’s actual age 
when he has an inaccurate birth document. This section ex-
plores how these inaccurate birth documents create problems 
for the criminal justice system at the three stages where age is 
relevant: at charging, while establishing an element of the 
crime, and during sentencing. 
A. STANDARD OF PROOF FOR AGE JURISDICTION  
The immigrant age problem first arises when juvenile 
courts must determine whether they have age jurisdiction over 
a defendant with an official-yet-inaccurate date of birth. Specif-
ically, courts must determine whether the burden of proof for 
age jurisdiction lies with the state when the defendant’s age is 
unclear. 
Yet these courts cannot look to the Constitution for guid-
ance.108 The Due Process Clause of the Constitution requires 
the state to prove each element of a crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt,109 and prohibits states from shifting the burden of proof 
to the defendant, except for affirmative defenses.110 But age ju-
risdiction is neither an element of the crime nor an affirmative 
defense.111 Therefore, the Due Process Clause dictates neither 
the burden of proof for age jurisdiction,112 nor which party bears 
the burden.113
Without constitutional guidance, different jurisdictions 
have adopted a number of different burdens for proving age ju-
risdiction. These standards range from placing the burden on 
the state to prove the defendant’s age beyond a reasonable 
doubt
 
114 to placing the burden on the defendant to disprove age 
jurisdiction so long as a “reasonable basis” exists to believe the 
defendant is an adult.115
 
 108. See United States v. Alvarez-Porras, 643 F.2d 54, 67 (2d Cir. 1981). 
 Within this spectrum of different bur-
 109. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
 110. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 205 (1977). 
 111. Alvarez-Porras, 643 F.2d at 67. 
 112. Cf. State v. Ali, 806 N.W.2d 45, 53–54 (Minn. 2011) (rejecting the ar-
gument that Due Process requires the state to prove jurisdiction beyond a rea-
sonable doubt). 
 113. Alvarez-Porras, 643 F.2d at 67. 
 114. See State v. Mohamed, 899 N.E.2d 1071, 1073 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008). 
 115. See State v. Sandomingo, 695 P.2d 592, 594 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985); see 
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dens of proof, two distinct approaches to age jurisdiction exist: 
(1) jurisdictions that require the state to prove age jurisdiction 
beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) jurisdictions that require 
lower burdens of proof of age jurisdiction.  
First, some jurisdictions treat age jurisdiction as the 
equivalent of an element of a crime because the court cannot 
enter a valid conviction unless it has jurisdiction.116 Because 
age jurisdiction is functionally an element of the crime, these 
jurisdictions require the state to prove the defendant’s age just 
as it must prove each element of a crime:117 beyond a reasonable 
doubt.118
In practice, it is difficult for the state to prove a defendant’s 
age beyond a reasonable doubt because the defendant needs on-
ly rebut the state’s claims, not prove his own age.
 
119 For in-
stance, in State v. Mohamed, the State brought forth a cata-
logue of evidence that defendant was eighteen: her birth 
certificate, her booking card, her marriage license, her state-
ment to the police, her co-conspirator’s statement, her child’s 
birth certificate, school records, immigration forms, and her 
application for state welfare benefits.120 In response, the de-
fendant elicited testimony from an expert witness that many 
Somali refugees did not know their birth dates.121 On the bal-
ance of this evidence, the trial court remanded the case to juve-
nile court because the State had not proven beyond a reasona-
ble doubt that the defendant was over eighteen.122
 
also Carsons v. Commonwealth, 47 S.W.2d 997, 1001–02 (Ky. 1931) (presum-
ing that the court has jurisdiction and thereby placing the burden on the de-
fendant to disprove jurisdiction). A number of jurisdictions have adopted 
standards of proof between these extremes. See Ali, 806 N.W.2d at 54 (prepon-
derance of the evidence); United States v. Salgado-Ocampo, 50 F. Supp. 2d 
908, 909 (D. Minn. 1999) (shifting burden to defendant once government 
makes a prima facie showing of age jurisdiction); State v. Duckett, 107 So. 
696, 697 (La. 1926) (clear and convincing evidence). 
 Short of 
prohibitively expensive and invasive bone marrow testing, it is 
 116. See State v. Neguse, 594 N.E.2d 1116, 1120 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991). 
 117. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
 118. See Mohamed, 899 N.E.2d at 1073; cf. Duckett, 107 So. at 697 (inter-
preting the statute to require the state to prove a child’s age by clear and con-
vincing evidence). 
 119. See, e.g., Mohamed, 899 N.E.2d at 1073. 
 120. Id. at 1072. 
 121. Id. (estimating that over ninety percent of ages assigned to Somali 
Bantu refugees were incorrect). 
 122. Id. at 1075. 
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unclear how the State could have ever proved beyond a reason-
able doubt that defendant was over eighteen.123
Second, other jurisdictions place a lower burden on the 
state to prove age jurisdiction in order to encourage the defend-
ant to put forth information about his age that only he can ac-
cess.
 
124 These jurisdictions reason that jurisdiction is separate 
from the elements of the crime because it does not relate to the 
defendant’s guilt.125 And although the defendant’s maximum 
penalty may hinge on which court (juvenile or adult) has juris-
diction,126 the defendant’s age will not directly increase his max-
imum penalty.127 Therefore, the state need not prove his age 
beyond a reasonable doubt.128
Practically, these jurisdictions recognize that requiring the 
State to prove age jurisdiction beyond a reasonable doubt is 
impractical, because unlike other jurisdictional factors—such 
as where the crime took place
 
129—the defendant has unique ac-
cess to the information necessary to prove his age.130 Indeed, 
some courts question whether the state could “ever meet a 
standard higher than preponderance of the evidence” where the 
defendant has an inaccurate or unknown date of birth.131
In practice, the lower evidentiary burden forces the de-





 123. See id. at 1073–74. 
 For instance, in United States v. Salga-
 124. See, e.g., United States v. Frasquillo-Zomosa, 626 F.2d 99, 102 (9th 
Cir. 1980) (“The age of the accused, unlike many elements of crimes, is a fact 
which at times may be peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused and 
sometimes, perhaps often, not susceptible to independent proof. Especially is 
this so where the accused is an alien.”). 
 125. See, e.g., State v. Ali, 806 N.W.2d 45, 52–53 (Minn. 2011). 
 126. See discussion supra Part I.C.1. 
 127. See Ali, 806 N.W.2d at 53 (“[E]stablishing the defendant’s age deter-
mines whether jurisdiction lies in the district or juvenile court. Once jurisdic-
tion is established, the defendant will be sentenced only if the State can prove 
the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
 128. See id. But see Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) 
(“[A]ny fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statu-
tory maximum must be . . . proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
 129. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 275 (1944) (finding 
federal jurisdiction in the district in which the defendant used the mails ille-
gally).  
 130. See Ali, 806 N.W.2d at 54. 
 131. Id.; cf. United States v. Salgado-Ocampo, 50 F. Supp. 2d 908, 909 (D. 
Minn. 1999) (“At the outset, the court notes the impossibility of definitively 
determining defendant’s date of birth.”). 
 132. See supra notes 119–23 and accompanying text. 
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do-Ocampo, the government first produced evidence that the 
defendant told various government authorities that he was 
eighteen years old.133 Because this evidence met the govern-
ment’s prima facie burden to prove the defendant’s age, the 
burden shifted to the defendant to prove his own age,134 which 
the defendant did with evidence uniquely in his possession: his 
mother’s testimony, a record of his baptism, and his elementary 
school records, all of which defendant obtained in Mexico.135 In 
this case, then, the lower burden allowed the court to accumu-
late all evidence available to both parties before it decided 
whether it had jurisdiction.136
As Salgado-Ocampo illustrates, the benefit of a lower bur-
den of proof for age jurisdiction is deliberation. Rather than 
merely rebutting the state’s evidence, the defendant must bring 
forth his own evidence of his age. Therefore, to determine 
whether it has jurisdiction, the court will have all available ev-
idence, not just evidence the state can obtain. 
 
B. EVIDENTIARY RULES FOR USE OF BIRTH DOCUMENTS AT 
TRIAL 
When age is an element of the crime—rather than an ele-
ment of jurisdiction—the state cannot circumvent the age prob-
lem by lowering the state’s burden of proof. After all, the Due 
Process Clause requires the state to prove each element of the 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.137 The issue, then, is not 
whether the state must prove age beyond a reasonable doubt, 
but how the state can prove age beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Specifically, what evidence may the state use to prove the de-
fendant’s or victim’s age?138
Certainly the state may rely on an array of circumstantial 
evidence to prove the defendant’s age, including testimony by 




 133. 50 F. Supp. 2d at 910.  
 testimony by the victim 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 911. 
 136. See id. at 912–13. 
 137. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
 138. This issue does not arise in an age jurisdiction hearing, because evi-
dentiary rules do not apply to preliminary hearings. See FED. R. EVID. 
1101(d)(3); see also United States v. Salgado-Ocampo, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 913 
(noting that evidence admitted at preliminary hearing on age jurisdiction 
“may not be admissible in the context of a trial”). 
 139. See People v. Scott, 141 P. 945, 946 (Cal. Ct. App. 1914). 
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himself,140 and even physical appearance.141 But in many cases, 
the state must rely on this circumstantial evidence because it 
does not have direct evidence of the victim’s or defendant’s age 
in the form of a birth certificate.142 Yet in the immigrant age 
problem, the state has the victim’s or defendant’s birth certifi-
cate, but cannot prove its accuracy.143 Nonetheless, evidentiary 
rules still permit the state to introduce this foreign birth certif-
icate to prove age—even if the birth certificate is inaccu-
rate144—because foreign birth certificates are self-
authenticating145 and excepted from the hearsay rules.146
Inaccurate foreign birth certificates are self-
authenticating. A foreign document is self-authenticating so 
long as a foreign official certifies that the document is an offi-
cial government document.
  
147 But the official only certifies that 
the document is a government record, not that the record is ac-
curate.148
Even self-authenticating birth certificates must satisfy 
other evidentiary rules,
 Therefore, the state (or defendant) may introduce an 
inaccurate foreign birth certificate so long as a foreign official 
attests that the certificate represents an official government 
record.  
149 and the hearsay rules could poten-
tially prohibit a court from admitting a foreign birth certifi-
cate.150
 
 140. See State v. Scroggs, 96 N.W. 723, 724 (Iowa 1903). 
 When the state admits a birth certificate to prove the 
defendant’s or victim’s age, it relies on a statement made by an 
 141. See Barnett v. State, 488 So. 2d 24, 24–25 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986) 
(stating that although the defendant’s physical appearance may be considered 
in determining age, some additional circumstantial evidence must be present-
ed as well). 
 142. Cf., e.g., id. at 24 (“The record supports the appellant's assertion that 
the state did not offer any direct evidence of the defendant's age during its 
case in chief. There is, however, no requirement that the proof of age be estab-
lished by direct evidence.”). 
 143. See supra notes 29–32 and accompanying discussion. 
 144. See supra notes 29–32 and accompanying discussion. 
 145. See FED. R. EVID. 902(3). 
 146. See id. 803(9). 
 147. Id. 902(3). 
 148. See United States v. Doyle, 130 F.3d 523, 545 (2d Cir. 1997) (“The re-
quirement that the document be ‘certified as correct’ means only that the au-
thenticating official certify that the copy delivered to the court is an accurate 
copy of the government record.”). 
 149. See, e.g., Raphaely Int’l, Inc. v. Waterman S.S., 972 F.2d 498, 502 (2d 
Cir. 1992) (noting that the hearsay rules still apply to authenticated foreign 
documents). 
 150. See FED. R. EVID. 801. 
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out-of-court declarant (the certificate’s stated date of birth) to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted (the defendant’s or vic-
tim’s actual age).151
However, a foreign birth certificate would fall under the 
hearsay exception for records of birth, so the state could still re-
ly on the certificate to prove the defendant’s or victim’s age. 
The hearsay rules except records of birth “if reported to a public 




For example, in 1969, the India Parliament passed a law 
requiring government designees to register all births,
 This exception could permit a court to admit a 
foreign birth certificate, despite its estimated age, as long as 
the foreign certificate was made pursuant to a legal duty. 
153 but 
even thirty years later India still failed to register even half of 
births in some states.154 In response to such low registration, 
India launched the National Campaign on Birth Certificates in 
2003.155 Because the National Campaign on Birth Certificates 
sought to register all children under ten,156 a nine-year old In-
dian child could get a valid government birth certificate, even 
though the child’s parents might estimate the child’s age.157 But 
despite the estimated date, the hearsay exception for birth rec-
ords would still permit a court to admit this birth certificate—
the certificate is a record of birth reported to India’s public of-
fice pursuant to a legal duty (the Registration of Births and 
Deaths Act).158
Therefore, this hearsay exception coupled with the self-
authentication of certified foreign documents permits the state 
to introduce a certified foreign birth certificate as evidence of 
 Because the birth records exception does not 
specify when the birth record must be reported, it is legally ir-
relevant that the Indian child’s parents estimated his age ap-
proximately nine years after birth. 
 
 151. See id. 
 152. FED. R. EVID. 803(9). 
 153. See The Registration of Births and Deaths Act, No. 18 of 1969, INDIA 
CODE (1993), vol. 5, § 8(1). 
 154. See PLAN, COUNT EVERY CHILD: ENSURING UNIVERSAL BIRTH REGIS-
TRATION IN INDIA 8 (2009), available at http://plan-international.org/ 
birthregistration/count-every-child-in-india. 
 155. National Campaign to Issue Birth Certificates, TIMES OF INDIA, Oct. 
16, 2003, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2003-10-16/bangalore/ 
27209625_1_certificates-first-phase-national-campaign. 
 156. Id. 
 157. See PLAN, COUNT EVERY CHILD, supra note 31, at 53.  
 158. See FED. R. EVID. 803(9). 
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the immigrant’s age, even when the court cannot determine the 
reliability of the birth certificate.159
But this hearsay exception only applies to birth records, 
not all government documents that list dates of birth.
 
160 There-
fore, this exception only affects immigrants with foreign birth 
certificates, not immigrants without any birth certificates.161 In 
cases where the immigrant does not have a foreign birth certifi-
cate—only a birth date that USCIS estimated162—the state may 
not rely on his government-issued documents to prove age. In 
these cases, the immigrant will have neither a foreign record 
nor a birth document, so the foreign government records will be 
neither self-authenticating nor excepted from hearsay rules.163 
Therefore, the state must prove the immigrant’s age as if he 
had no documentation listing his date of birth.164
C. AGE CHARACTERISTICS AND SENTENCING 
 
It may appear that the sentencing court will know the de-
fendant’s age by the time it must sentence him. After all, prior 
to trial the court must determine in a preliminary hearing 
whether it has age jurisdiction, a decision that requires the 
court to find that the defendant is too old for juvenile court.165
However, because the age of transfer to district court does 
not align with the age of constitutionally permissible execution, 
a court may still encounter the age problem at sentencing with-
out guidance from an earlier finding of age. States impose the 
death penalty almost exclusively on convicted murderers,
 
166 and 
in order to sentence the convicted murder to death the state 
must first find that he was over eighteen when he committed 
the crime.167
 
 159. See, e.g., New York Life Ins. v. Aronson, 38 F. Supp. 687, 688 (W.D. 
Pa. 1941) (“The objection [to the admissibility of the birth certificates] is with-
out merit, as it undertakes to prescribe requirements for the introduction of 
foreign records not specified in [the applicable Rules].”). 
 It may seem that prior to sentencing the court al-
 160. See FED. R. EVID. 803(9). 
 161. See supra notes 44–50 and accompanying discussion. 
 162. See supra Part I.B. 
 163. See FED. R. EVID. 803(9). 
 164. Cf., e.g., United States v. Salgado-Ocampo, 50 F. Supp. 2d 908, 910, 
913 (D. Minn. 1999) (noting that government documents, including defend-
ant’s driver’s license, “may not be admissible in the context of a trial”). 
 165. See supra Part II.A. 
 166. See VICTOR STREIB, DEATH PENALTY IN A NUTSHELL 69 (3d ed. 2008). 
Some states additionally categorize treason and espionage as capital crimes, 
but “prosecution and conviction for these crimes are extremely rare.” Id. at 71. 
 167. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (stating that the 
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ready made this finding. The mere fact that a district court had 
jurisdiction to try the defendant means that the court previous-
ly found that the defendant was eighteen or older.168
But juvenile transfer laws negate this assumption. In 
murder cases, thirty five states try children in district court at 
ages younger than eighteen by either (a) mandating the juve-
nile court to transfer the defendant to district court, or (b) 
stripping the juvenile court of jurisdiction to try murder cas-
es.
 
169 In these cases, then, the court will only make one age-
related preliminary finding: that the defendant is over the age 
of transfer.170 Significantly, the court will not find that the de-
fendant is over the constitutionally-relevant age of eighteen.171
For instance, imagine that an Alabama immigrant with an 
estimated age of seventeen-and-a-half commits a capital crime. 
Due to Alabama’s statutory exclusion of capital crimes, the ju-
venile court will not have jurisdiction so long as it finds the de-




Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid “imposition of the death penalty 
on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were commit-
ted”). 
 The defendant has two choices. 
First, the defendant can concede that he is sixteen or older and 
proceed with his case in district court; the juvenile court then 
would not have to make a finding of age. Second, the defendant 
can claim that the juvenile court has jurisdiction because he is, 
in reality, younger than sixteen. If the juvenile court disagrees, 
it will find itself without jurisdiction based on its finding that 
 168. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 260B.007 subd. 3 (2012) (granting the juvenile 
court jurisdiction over defendants under eighteen years old). Granted, this log-
ic would only apply to jurisdictions where the juvenile court has jurisdiction 
over defendants up to age eighteen. Cf., e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1501(7) 
(2012) (granting the juvenile court jurisdiction over defendants under sixteen 
years old). 
 169. See PATRICK GRIFFIN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TRYING JUVE-
NILES AS ADULTS: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER LAWS AND REPORTING 4 
(2011), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/232434.pdf (“Func-
tionally, a mandatory waiver law resembles a statutory exclusion, removing a 
designated category of cases from juvenile court jurisdiction.”). Through one of 
these two mechanisms, 35 states force juvenile defendants charged with mur-
der or “capital crimes” into district court before they reach age eighteen. Id. at 
5–6 (noting that the minimum age of transfer in these states ranges from no 
minimum age to 17 years old). 
 170. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-127(a) (2012) (requiring the juvenile 
court to transfer to district court any child over age fourteen charged with a 
capital offense). 
 171. See supra Part I.C.3. 
 172. ALA. CODE § 12-15-204(a)(1) (2009). 
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the defendant is sixteen or older.173
Instead, a court could potentially rely on inaccurate birth 
documents when it decides whether a defendant is old enough 
for the court to sentence him to death or life without parole for 
a non-homicide offense. It is unclear how a court would handle 
this life or death decision—courts have not encountered this 
situation. Yet this issue is likely to arise—currently, at least 
1161 people are serving life sentences for crimes they commit-
ted between their seventeenth and eighteenth birthdays.
 In either event, the sentenc-
ing court will not be able to rely on a previous finding that the 
defendant is over eighteen. 
174 Be-
cause the court draws a bright line at eighteen, it is possible 
that an immigrant with an age range that straddles this line 
will commit a capital crime,175
In addition, because evidentiary standards at sentencing 
are less stringent than evidentiary standards at trial,
 and a court will have to decide 
whether it can constitutionally sentence him as an adult. 
176 a court 
might simply use the date of birth USCIS estimated to deter-
mine the defendant’s exact age, even if the assigned date of 
birth is inaccurate.177 In fact, because evidentiary rules do not 
apply to sentencing proceedings,178 only due process standards 
directly179
 
 173. See id. While the juvenile court could enter a specific finding of age 
that the sentencing court could use later, courts often resolve matters of age 
jurisdiction by merely finding that the defendant is older or younger than the 
statutory threshold, perhaps because determining the defendant’s exact age is 
nearly impossible. See United States v. Salgado-Ocampo, 50 F. Supp. 2d 908, 
909 (D. Minn. 1999) (“At the outset, the court notes the impossibility of defini-
tively determining defendant’s date of birth.”); State v. Sandomingo, 695 P.2d 
592, 594 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) (noting that the trial court thought the de-
fendant appeared older than seventeen, “but had no definitive means of de-
termining his age”). 
 limit the evidence the court may consider: the evi-
 174. See AMNESTY INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE REST OF THEIR 
LIVES: LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR CHILD OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES 
25–26 (2005), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ 
TheRestofTheirLives.pdf (noting that at least 2225 children were serving life 
sentences, and 52.2% of these children committed the crime between their 
seventeenth and eighteenth birthdays). 
 175. Cf., e.g., Hegvik e-mail, supra note 11 (noting that defendant claimed 
to be seventeen at the time he committed the crime although his birth certifi-
cate indicated that he was eighteen). 
 176. See FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(3). 
 177. See supra Part II.B. 
 178. See FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(3); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 6A1.3(a) cmt. (2011) (“In determining the relevant facts, sentencing judges 
are not restricted to information that would be admissible at trial.”). 
 179. The appellate abuse of discretion standard does, however, indirectly 
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dence must have “sufficient indicia of reliability.”180 And even 
“uncorroborated hearsay” meets the due process reliability 
standard if the defendant has a chance to rebut or explain the 
hearsay.181 Therefore, to make this life-or-death decision—
whether a defendant is old enough to execute—the court can 
consider a wide range of minimally reliable evidence.182
III.  SOLUTION   
 This 
lower evidentiary standard amplifies the risk that a court will 
mistakenly sentence a juvenile to death or life without parole 
for a non-homicide offense simply because his estimated birth 
date was older than his actual birth date.  
Because immigrants with inaccurate-yet-official birth 
dates must still face the age-specific boundaries in the criminal 
justice system, courts must develop standards to deal with the 
age uncertainty of the immigrant age problem. This section 
proposes a separate solution for each phase of the criminal jus-
tice process where age is relevant: (1) courts should rebuttably 
presume that the defendant’s birth document is accurate for 
purposes of determining age jurisdiction; (2) courts should not 
admit inaccurate birth dates at trial to prove age as an element 
of the crime; and (3) courts should consider a defendant’s age 
characteristics—rather than trying to determine his actual 
birth date—when deciding whether they can sentence the de-
fendant to death or life without parole for a non-homicide of-
fense. 
A. REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION OF AGE JURISDICTION 
In order to deal with the difficulty of determining whether 
a district court has age jurisdiction, courts should adopt a re-
buttable presumption that the defendant’s date of birth on his 
government documents is his actual date of birth. If the de-
fendant rebuts the presumption, the state must then prove age 
jurisdiction by its jurisdictional burden of proof using other 
means of evidence.183
 
limit the court’s sentencing decision. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. McFarlin, 
587 A.2d 732, 735 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (“Abuse of discretion consists of over-
looking pertinent facts, disregarding the force of the evidence, committing an 
error of law, or imposing a sentence which exceeds the statutory maximum.”). 
 
 180. United States v. Ortiz, 636 F.3d 389, 393 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 181. United States v. Pratt, 553 F.3d 1165, 1170 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 182. See id. 
 183. See supra Part II.B. 
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Courts should presume that the defendant’s listed date of 
birth is accurate for two reasons. First, this presumption solves 
the information imbalance that states face when only the de-
fendant “has direct knowledge and control over the information 
necessary to resolve the dispute” about his age.184 Functionally, 
this presumption requires the defendant to supply the court 
with information of which he has direct knowledge and con-
trol—such as self-testimony,185 baptismal records,186 or school 
registration187
Second, this presumption will not offend constitutional re-
quirements for presumptions.
—in order to rebut his government-listed age. 
Therefore, this presumption will allow the court to resolve the 
age problem by considering all documentation available, not 
just the limited information available to the state. And this 
presumption will also benefit defendants: when their govern-
ment-listed age is under the juvenile age, the juvenile court will 
be presumed to have jurisdiction. 
188 A presumption is constitution-
al when a rational connection exists “between the fact proved 
and the ultimate fact presumed.”189
 
 184. State v. Ali, 806 N.W.2d 45, 54 (Minn. 2011). 
 This presumption would 
apply to all cases of age jurisdiction, including cases where de-
 185. See, e.g., United States v. Dire, 680 F.3d 446, 476 (4th Cir. 2012). Cur-
rently, the Fifth Amendment shields the defendant from self-testimony in 
states that consider age jurisdiction an element of the offense. Cf. United 
States v. Frasquillo-Zomosa, 626 F.2d 99, 102 (9th Cir. 1980) (“Construction of 
the age of the accused as a substantive element of the offense would permit 
the accused to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege as to this essential fact, 
thereby delaying, if not prohibiting, a determination of the appropriate man-
ner of proceeding.”). 
 186. United States v. Salgado-Ocampo, 50 F. Supp. 2d 908, 911 (D. Minn. 
1999). 
 187. Id. This approach is also similar to the approach other nations take. 
For example, in the Philippines courts first consider the child’s birth certifi-
cate; then the child’s early birth records, such as baptismal certificates or 
school documents; and finally, testimony. See RULE ON JUVENILES IN CON-
FLICT WITH THE LAW, A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC (S.C., Feb. 28, 2002) (Phil.), availa-
ble at http://www.lawphil.net/courts/supreme/am/am_02_1_18_sc_2002.html. 
 188. As discussed, some courts hold that age jurisdiction is an element of 
the crime that the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. See discussion 
supra notes 116–23 and accompanying text. In courts that hold that Due Pro-
cess does not mandate any standard of proof for age jurisdiction, the constitu-
tional rules for presumptions in criminal cases will not apply. See supra notes 
108–13 and accompanying text; cf. Harold A. Ashford & D. Michael Risinger, 
Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due Process in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical 
Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165, 165 (1969) (“[I]t has likewise been clear that pre-
sumptive language may not be used to circumvent substantive constitutional 
rights.”). 
 189. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943).  
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fendants have accurate birth dates on their documents.190
However, this presumption may fail in states that consider 
age jurisdiction as an element of a crime.
 
Therefore, in most cases, a rational connection exists between 
the fact proved (the birth date on the government document) 
and the ultimate fact presumed (defendant’s age). Indeed, in 
most cases the presumption is flawless. Because this presump-
tion is true for most defendants—though not defendants with 
inaccurate birth dates—it is constitutional. 
191 In these states, this 
presumption will violate the constitutional requirement that 
the state must prove all elements of a crime beyond a reasona-
ble doubt,192 because the presumption functionally shifts the 
burden of disproving age jurisdiction to the defendant: the state 
can simply point to the defendant’s listed birth date, then the 
defendant must prove the date is inaccurate. Therefore, this so-
lution will work only in states that consider age a separate ju-
risdictional element, not an element of a crime.193
B. EXCLUSION OF BIRTH DOCUMENTS AT TRIAL 
 
Rules of evidence permit courts to admit foreign certified 
birth certificates at trial because these documents are self-
authenticating and excepted from hearsay limitations.194
The hearsay rules except birth certificates from the hear-
say rule for two reasons: necessity and trustworthiness.
 None-
theless, courts should exclude these documents when age is an 
element of the crime because these foreign birth certificates 
undermine the rationale of the hearsay exception for birth rec-
ords.  
195 First, 
birth documents are necessary to prove age because they often 
do not reach the court until years after birth, so forcing a party 
to prove age by other means would be impractical.196
 
 190. This presumption would apply, for instance, to a child born in the 
United States whose birth date is not in question. 
 Second, 
 191. See, e.g., State v. Neguse, 594 N.E.2d 1116, 1120 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) 
(holding that age was an element of subject matter jurisdiction, which needed 
to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt). 
 192. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
 193. See, e.g., State v. Ali, 806 N.W.2d 45, 53–54 (Minn. 2011) (“[W]hen the 
age of the defendant determines the jurisdiction of the court, the State has the 
burden of proving . . . the defendant’s age on the date of the alleged offense.”). 
 194. See supra Part II.B. 
 195. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVI-
DENCE § 8:93 (3d ed. 2007). 
 196. Id. 
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birth documents are trustworthy because public officials usual-
ly create these documents in the ordinary course of work, and 
there is little dispute over the age.197 Certainly, the first ra-
tionale applies to foreign birth certificates—a defendant’s birth 
date is nearly impossible to prove without a birth certificate.198
But the second rationale does not apply to foreign birth 
documents, which do not have the “circumstantial probability 
of trustworthiness” that justifies the hearsay exception.
  
199 To 
the contrary, these foreign birth certificates may often be inac-
curate because they can come from the parent’s estimate of 
when the child was born, sometimes years after birth.200 There-
fore, the hearsay exception should not apply to these inaccurate 
birth certificates, and courts should not admit them.201
In opposition, states might argue that even if the birth rec-
ords exception fails in certain cases, the court should nonethe-
less admit allegedly inaccurate birth certificates. A defendant 
can challenge the weight and credibility of his birth certificate 
on a case-by-case basis, and the state’s high burden of proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt eliminates the risk of an erroneous de-
cision based on an inaccurate birth certificate alone.
  
202
But the immigrant age warrants special treatment because 
it presents a systematic problem that, as a class, undermines 
the rationale for the birth records exception.
 There-
fore, the court does not need to make an exception to the 
hearsay exception—an inaccurate birth certificate is no differ-
ent than any other disputed evidence. 
203
 
 197. Id.; cf. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1370 (3d ed. 1942) (noting 
that a degree of trustworthiness in a class of evidence justifies each hearsay 
exception). 
 Granted, a court 
might properly place a burden on the defendant to challenge 
 198. See United States v. Salgado-Ocampo, 50 F. Supp. 2d 908, 909 (D. 
Minn. 1999) (“[T]he court notes the impossibility of definitively determining 
defendant’s date of birth.”). 
 199. See WIGMORE, supra note 197, at § 1370. 
 200. See discussion supra notes 29–32 and accompanying text. 
 201. Alternatively, courts could refuse to authenticate the foreign birth cer-
tificate if the certificate appears to be “suspicious in [its] tenor or on [its] face.” 
See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 195, at § 9:32. 
 202. See 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVI-
DENCE: COMMENTARY ON RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES 
COURTS AND STATE COURTS ¶ 803, at 314 (1996) (“If the opponent of the rec-
ord does not believe the statements contained in the record, he is free to call 
the parents for cross-examination or to introduce other evidence controverting 
the facts stated.”). 
 203. See supra text accompanying notes 195–99. 
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the weight and credibility of a birth certificate when a single 
mistake renders the certificate unreliable.204 In these isolated 
instances, the defendant bears only a minimal burden to dis-
prove the accuracy of the certificate, so the court need not cre-
ate an entire exception to the birth records rule.205
At trial, then, the court must first determine whether the 
birth certificate is, in fact, inaccurate, considering, among other 
factors, the defendant’s place of birth,
 However, 
because the immigrant age problem is not isolated, but poten-
tially widespread, inaccurate birth certificates as a class war-
rant an exception to the birth records exception. Otherwise, 
each case would risk an erroneous decision based on the inac-
curate document. 
206 and the listed birth 
date.207 If the court finds the birth certificate is inaccurate, it 
should exclude the document and instead, the state will have to 
prove age as if the immigrant had no listed birthday by relying 
on other evidence, such as testimony,208 physical appearance,209 
or forensic testing.210 In addition, to prove the victim’s age the 
state (or defendant) could also rely on testimony from the vic-
tim himself.211
 
 204. See, e.g., United States v. Austrew, 202 F. Supp. 816, 822 (D. Md. 
1962) (admitting victim’s birth certificate even though the certificate reversed 
her middle and last names, which “weaken[ed] the document’s evidentiary 
value”). 
 
 205. Additionally, when the court encounters isolated incidents of unrelia-
ble birth documents, instead of invalidating the birth records exception the 
court may exclude the evidence as substantially prejudicial in relation to its 
probative value. See FED. R. EVID. 403. But because the immigrant age prob-
lem is too widespread, a court will better protect the defendant from an erro-
neous finding by categorically excluding inaccurate birth certificates rather 
than finding substantial prejudice in each case. 
 206. For example, a birth certificate from Central and Eastern Europe 
(92% registration rate) would more likely be accurate than a birth certificate 
from Sub-Saharan Africa (37% registration rate). See PLAN, COUNT EVERY 
CHILD, supra note 31, at 10.  
 207. For instance, a January 1 date of birth would be more suspect than a 
less frequently assigned birth date. See Baxter, supra note 1. 
 208. See, e.g., United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 642, 673–74 (E.D. 
Va. 2010). 
 209. See, e.g., Barnett v. State, 488 So. 2d 24, 24–25 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986). 
 210. See, e.g., Andreas Schmeling et al., Forensic Age Estimation in Unac-
companied Minors and Young Living Adults, in FORENSIC MEDICINE: FROM 
OLD PROBLEMS TO NEW CHALLENGES 77, 83–94 (Duarte Nuno Vieira ed., 
2011) (describing methods of forensically testing carpus, dental, and clavicle 
for age assessments). 
 211. See, e.g., United States v. Austrew, 202 F. Supp. 816, 822 (D. Md. 
1962) (“[U]nder an exception to the hearsay rule of great antiquity, one's own 
testimony as to his age is sufficient.”). The Fifth Amendment, however, would 
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Of course, relying on this evidence without using the spe-
cific date on a birth certificate will make age more difficult for 
the state to prove—particularly beyond a reasonable doubt.212 
But not only does omitting suspect foreign birth certificates 
comport with the rationale for the hearsay exception for birth 
records, it also treats all estimated birth dates equally. Without 
this rule, estimated birth dates on foreign birth certificates 
would be admissible; estimated birth dates on other official 
documents would not.213
C. AGE CHARACTERISTICS AND SENTENCING 
 With this rule, though, all estimated 
birth dates would be inadmissible in a criminal trial. Therefore, 
while this rule places a higher burden on the state, it comports 
with the rationale of the hearsay exception for birth certifi-
cates, and it treats all estimated birth dates equally by making 
each inadmissible. 
Because a court cannot accurately determine the defend-
ant’s age due to the immigrant age problem, it cannot deter-
mine whether the defendant is constitutionally old enough for 
the court to sentence him to death or life without parole for a 
non-homicide offense.214 Instead, in cases where the defendant 
falls close to the crucial age (eighteen), the court should consid-
er whether the defendant’s age characteristics—immaturity, 
susceptibility to peer pressure, and character underdevelop-
ment215
 
bar the state from forcing the defendant himself to testify as to his age. See 
U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
—show that the defendant is culpable enough for the 
 212. See State v. Ali, 806 N.W.2d 45, 54 (Minn. 2011) (“[I]t is questionable 
in situations in which the defendant's country of origin does not maintain 
birth records whether, in a case in which a defendant's age is open to question, 
the State could ever meet a standard higher than preponderance of the evi-
dence.”). 
 213. See supra notes 160–64and accompanying text. 
 214. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010); Roper v. Sim-
mons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005). 
 215. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70. In Miller v. Alabama, the Court called the-
se three characteristics the “hallmark features” of juveniles. 132 S. Ct. 2455, 
2468 (2012). But the Miller court also outlined more factors of youthfulness a 
sentencing court could consider: (1) the defendant’s family environment; (2) 
the extent of the defendant’s participation in the crime; and (3) the defendant’s 
inability to navigate the criminal justice system due to his youth, such as his 
inability to deal with police or prosecutors, or his “incapacity to assist his own 
attorneys.” Id. Under this proposed solution, a court could certainly consider 
these factors as further circumstantial evidence of the juvenile’s culpability. 
But at minimum, the court should analyze the three “hallmark features” of 
juveniles that led the Supreme Court to categorically prohibit death and life 
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court to sentence him to death or life without parole for a non-
homicide offense. Specifically, because young adults increase in 
maturity the most between sixteen and nineteen,216 a psycho-
logical analysis of a defendant with an unknown birth date 
might reveal whether he is psychologically mature enough for 
society to hold him culpable, and to what degree.217
This solution has two benefits. First, it is consistent with 
the Supreme Court’s rationale for prohibiting death and life 
without parole sentences for juveniles that commit non-
homicide offenses: children are different psychologically.
  
218
Second, this solution is practical. Courts currently use 
presentence investigation reports to assess sentencing factors, 
including the nature of the crime and the defendant’s psycho-
logical profile.
 This 
solution considers the psychological difference between adults 
and children by examining whether the child’s psychological 
immaturity motivated the (potentially) capital crime. 
219 Where the court cannot determine the defend-
ant’s age with accuracy, the presentence investigation report 
for a crime with a potential sentence of death or life without 
parole for a non-homicide offense could also consider the three 
age-relevant characteristics: the defendant’s maturity, the role 
peer pressure played in the crime, and the defendant’s poten-
tial to further develop and rehabilitate his character.220
 
without parole sentences for non-homicide offenses. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 
2030; Roper, 543 U.S. at 578–79. 
 If these 
factors suggest the defendant’s youth played a large role in the 
crime, the court should not sentence the defendant to death or 
life without parole; if these factors were absent, the court could 
grant these sentences. 
 216. Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, (Im)maturity of Judgment 
in Adolescence: Why Adolescents May Be Less Culpable than Adults, 18 BEHAV. 
SCI. & L. 741, 756 (2000). 
 217. Cf. id. at 757 (“[I]t is important to consider individual differences, ra-
ther than simply age, when assessing decision-making ability or maturity of 
judgment among adolescents.”). 
 218. See supra Part II.C. In fact, other scholars have recommended giving 
defendants a sentencing discount based on youthful characteristics, not just 
age. See, e.g., Franklin E. Zimring, Toward a Jurisprudence of Youth Violence, 
24 CRIME & JUST. 477, 487 (1998) (“Even when sufficient cognitive capacity 
and emotional control is present to pass the threshold of criminal capacity, a 
significant deficit in the capacity to appreciate or control behavior would mean 
the forbidden conduct is not as much the offender's fault, and the quantum of 
appropriate punishment is less.”). 
 219. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, THE 
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 7–17 (1984). 
 220. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70.  
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However, this solution still places a life or death decision in 
the hands of the court based on inaccurate factors. While a psy-
chological profile might more accurately predict whether the 
defendant is culpable, it still does not accurately predict the de-
fendant’s age. In addition, courts could already use a psycholog-
ical profile in their current decision—whether the defendant is 
eighteen—so long as the profile is sufficiently reliable.221
Nonetheless, this solution allows courts to assess the cul-
pability by relying on a professional psychological analysis, ra-
ther than assessing a defendant’s age based on an estimated 
birth date. Therefore, in cases where a court cannot follow the 
letter of the law because the defendant’s age is unknown, it 
may nonetheless follow the spirit of the law by prohibiting 
death sentences for psychologically immature defendants. 
 
  CONCLUSION   
The immigrant age problem originates when children are 
born in countries that do not keep birth records or otherwise 
limit children from getting birth certificates. Sometime after 
birth, these children receive birth certificates, and their par-
ents estimate the date of birth. When these children emigrate 
to the United States, this estimated date of birth becomes their 
official date of birth on government documents: immigrant 
files, green cards, and driver’s licenses. The government ac-
cepts the uncertainty because it does not need an exact age for 
monitoring immigration or allocating government resources. 
But this uncertainty is unacceptable in the criminal justice sys-
tem. At three stages of the criminal process—charging, trial, 
and sentencing—the criminal justice system distinguishes on 
the basis of specific ages. Because of this, immigrants with ap-
proximated birthdates on their official government documents 
pose a problem at each of these stages. 
Yet courts have yet to craft standards to fix the problems. 
They have not addressed what burden of proof to use for charg-
ing the defendant in district court rather than juvenile court, 
whether these documents are admissible at trial, or how the 
uncertainty affects constitutional limitations on sentencing. To 
alleviate this problem, this Note proposes a different solution 
for each step of the criminal process. For charging, courts 
should adopt a rebuttable presumption that the listed birth 
date is accurate in order to put the burden on the defendant, 
 
 221. See United States v. Ortiz, 636 F.3d 389, 393 (8th Cir. 2011). 
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who will have more knowledge about his own date of birth, to 
prove his own age. At trial, the hearsay rule should bar courts 
from admitting the birth documents. Finally, at sentencing, 
courts should not attempt to determine the defendant’s actual 
age. Instead, courts should consider only the defendant’s age 
characteristics—immaturity, susceptibility to peer pressure, 
and character underdevelopment—to determine whether the 
defendant’s youthfulness prohibits the court from sentencing 
him to death or life without parole for a non-homicide offense. 
 
 
